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6 1  INTRODUCTION: HOW DID FISCAL TRANSPARENCY REACH 
THE ACADEMIC AGENDA?
With applications in financial, regulatory, monetary, and fiscal policy, and with the 
World Bank, IMF, OECD, and many other NGOs advising on best practices, fiscal 
transparency has become a major theme of contemporary research in political 
economy and public administration. It was not always so. Even though the con-
nection between transparency and corruption prevention was understood by the 
ancient Athenians, the connection with democracy at least since 1689, and the 
importance of bookkeeping and auditing practices in economic development even 
earlier, there was little academic interest in the causes and consequences of trans-
parency. An important stimulus to academic thought was Holmström (1979), with 
10,000+ citations. One could weave a narrative through three subsequent streams 
of analysis – institutions, corruption, and debt – in academia with real-world 
developments from Watergate, the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the found-
ing of Transparency International, some aggressive lobbying by US firms, to the 
FCPA Amendments and OECD Convention of 1997-98. However, even though 
the 1990s saw increased attention to information, opportunism, and verification 
and the path-breaking publication of Mauro (1995, also 10,000+ citations), there 
was essentially no mention of “transparency”. It is no longer so.
Today, according to the US Department of State (2017), fiscal transparency is a 
critical element of effective public financial management, one that helps in build-
ing market confidence and underpins economic sustainability. Fiscal transparency 
also fosters greater government accountability by providing a window into gov-
ernment budgets for citizens, helping them to hold their leadership accountable 
and facilitating better-informed public debate. These pronouncements may be 
somewhat exaggerated, but around the literature one finds similar claims, that 
transparency promotes not only stability, sustainability, and credibility, but even 
trust. These claims have some truth in them, but overall the evidence in support of 
them is mixed. Our goal in this note is to look at twenty years of transparency 
research and highlight what is known and what is new.
A common view of fiscal transparency twenty years ago was that budgets that 
included numerous special accounts and failed to consolidate all fiscal activity 
into a “bottom line” were too complex to comprehend and thus not transparent. 
More complete definitions contained observability in two senses: that information 
provided should be accurate, comprehensive, timely, accessible, and verified, and 
that there should be receipt (and maybe comprehension) of information by the 
public, an argument at least as old as Bentham, for whom “publicity” was a central 
concept. In these senses, transparency requires state capacity to calculate and 
technology to make information accessible and forbids it to be withheld. Acquir-
ing and understanding information has become more costly with complexity and 
contested components like risk and sustainability, especially for receivers who 
need more ability to “read”. For accountability, receivers need the capacity 



































43 (1) 5-13 (2019)
7recently transparency has come to include rights of public participation in deci-
sions: this is very different.
In January 1998 George Kopits and Jon Craig wrote “Transparency in Govern-
ment Operations”, an IMF Occasional Paper. It represents a turning point, even 
though (amazingly to me), it has had only 500 citations in the twenty years since. 
Their argument was straightforward: timely publication of a clearly presented 
budget document (i.e., transparency) allowed the market to evaluate government’s 
intentions, key to the market imposing discipline on government. As Kopits and 
Craig saw it, this would increase political risk (i.e., impose a cost on incumbent 
politicians of running unsustainable policies). Moreover, transparent public finan-
cial accounting would allow comparing budgeted and actual financial operations, 
and thus facilitate achievement of basic macroeconomic policy objectives and 
increase the productivity of public expenditure. More generally, boldly, transpar-
ency would thus increase trust in government. For evidence (mostly narrative), 
they alleged strong a priori reasons that transparency improves economic perfor-
mance, arguing that it was a precondition for sustainability, accountability, and 
corruption prevention. Although citation was sparse, others quickly picked up the 
theme: within a year Vito Tanzi published “Corruption Around the World: Causes, 
Consequences, Scope, and Cures” in the IMF Staff Papers and Bill Easterly’s 
“When is fiscal adjustment an illusion?” appeared a few months later. It seemed as 
though the rush to data and empirical research to examine these claims was on.
2 THE FIRST DECADE AND BEYOND
By 2006 NGOs had produced a flood of indicators. The IMF had managed to get 
half its members to do a ROSC (Report on Standards and Codes) based on its 
1998 Code and Transparency manual. The OECD’s country surveys produced a 
report on best practices in 2002. The first Open Budget Index, prepared with the 
opinions of independent experts rather than national government officials, came 
out in 2006. Nevertheless, limited empirical work appeared. What did mostly 
assumed that “More information is better” (citing Holmström) and focused on 
moral hazard and career concerns. An early model by Ferejohn (1999) assumed all 
politicians were motivated only by rents (no screening effects) and made transpar-
ency endogenous by allowing the agent (politician) to choose the observability of 
her actions. Politicians could thus commit to more effort (more transparency), 
receiving higher tax-based compensation than if action were completely hidden. 
The result: under some conditions, transparency increases incumbent retention 
and fiscal scale by reducing the negative impact of tax increases.
An early empirical paper employing this approach was Alt, Lassen, and Skilling 
(2002) on governor approval in opinion polls in US states. They collected nine 
indicators from published sources (based on surveys of civil servants) on whether 
states were committed to GAAP, using a binding independent revenue forecast, 
including performance results, voting the budget in a single bill, and so on. They 
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8 scale and higher governor approval ratings. Alt, Lassen, and Rose (2006) tackled 
the obvious endogeneity (joint causation) problem with earlier results by collect-
ing an interview-based retrospective panel dataset for 1972-2002, since replicated 
and still requested. These data showed that political competition was associated 
with greater transparency (subsequently independently confirmed), political 
polarization was associated with lower transparency, and that fiscal imbalance 
was associated with increases in transparency (evident in case studies but less 
robust in the quantitative analysis). Other papers (Alt and Lassen, 2006a, 2006b, 
2008; Alt and Lowry, 2010) showed that transparency was less successful in 
reducing deficits when competitive pressures of the electoral calendar increased, 
that competitive institutions conditioning transparency were associated with lower 
corruption, that the US municipal bond market’s response to state deficits was 
conditioned by institutional transparency, and that in the US, electoral support 
(vote and frequency of electoral defeat) revealed that raising taxes transparently 
hurts incumbent governors less.
Theory in the early years pushed to go beyond the sole focus on moral hazard, 
largely (to sum up a complex subject) because of a growing awareness that with 
incomplete incentives, results become more complicated and conditional. For 
example, in models of voting to re-elect, discipline and selection have opposing 
welfare effects via equilibrium behavior if there are good and bad types (Besley, 
2006). A flirtation with yardstick competition helped a little. Others raised the pos-
sibility of “too much sunshine” (Hood and Heald, 2006) or the wrong information 
structure (Prat, 2005). Though it was clear that there remained a big role for insti-
tutional analysis, causality (to say nothing of measuring the relative frequency of 
types) often appeared ambiguous. In other ways there were still missing aspects of 
transparency. At most we were measuring access to information as opposed to its 
quantity and quality, justification, or verifiability, and even access was only meas-
ured by communications media freedom and penetration (newspapers and televi-
sion, not yet the impact of the Internet).
There was also much more empirical work by other scholars, and the field has 
expanded rapidly in recent years. De Renzio and Wehner (2017) provide an excel-
lent review; there are other reviews (cited in their sources) but this one is most 
useful for the theme of this Note. They conclude that over a number of diverse 
papers the origins of transparency do seem to involve fiscal stress and political 
competition, but that there are only mixed macro results on spending, deficits, and 
debt. Results seem to be conditional on the presence of mechanisms of dissemina-
tion to lower acquisition costs, like the availability of a free press. Transparency 
appears good for LDC investment, but whether it is also good for development is 
at best a “maybe”. On publicity (the impact of actual receipt of information), there 
are important results on audits, media freedom, and maybe penetration. Since 
fresh perspectives are helpful, we will look more closely at some of these below. 
Finally, de Renzio and Wehner find that participation affects the distribution 
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9empowerment with process, but remain appropriately (in my view) skeptical about 
research cumulation, strength, and impact.
3 2010 AND AFTER
“Traditional” data sources expanded enormously as “practitioners” provided new 
data sources. NGOs have been hyperactive: the World Bank is creating datasets on 
Government Statistical Capacity and has launched the Budget Transparency Ini-
tiative, the International Budget Project regularly releases new versions of the 
Open Budget Index, and the IMF in 2017 revised definitions of net and gross debt 
in its World Economic Outlook database while joining the World Bank and other 
institutions in establishing PEFA, the Public Expenditure and Financial Account-
ability framework. Several of these institutions and others form GIFT, the Global 
Initiative for Fiscal Transparency, which among other things provides an online 
Open Fiscal Data Package. Then there is the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative; also, Eurostat provides the Financial Transparency system to enable 
examination of EU funding recipients via online searches. There are also two 
major “private” datasets available: Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland (2018), and 
Williams (2014). Both make heavy use of the World Bank’s World Development 
Index data, gauging a country to be non-transparent to the extent that its data do 
not appear in the WDI. Williams uses more sources, but the main contribution of 
both is to make data available for more countries in more years, shifting the focus 
to developing countries (in particular middle-income autocracies) and state capac-
ity and willingness to disclose information. Replicating existing results for 
advanced countries (e.g. Alt, Lassen, and Wehner, 2014) does not apparently pro-
vide a great deal of new information.
More importantly, conceptual and measurement innovations abound. There have 
been a number of creative new looks. Here I will highlight just a few: new ways to 
approach freedom of information, including performance evaluation, getting closer 
to the details of accurate accounting, including public participation. Many of these 
areas have benefitted from the increasing use of experiments, especially in eco-
nomics but also to some extent in political science and public administration.
One very creative new look was Berliner’s (2014) examination of the passage of 
Freedom of Information Acts (FOI laws) that can increase the cost to politicians of 
corrupt acts, especially in democracies. He notes the conundrum that electoral 
promises to increase transparency were rarely or at best slowly kept, but many laws 
were passed regardless, almost all new laws since 1995 in developing countries. 
The argument is that this is an insurance or hand-tying game, that the laws pass 
when a governing party fears losing power, or in some way holds power but does 
not expect to keep it. The argument is supported by narratives from countries such 
as Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Canada, Guinea, Niger, and Nigeria. These and 
subsequent related results recall some of the original Alt-Lassen-Rose findings on 
the importance of competition as a conditioning context. Increases also appear to 
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10 The PEFA (2016) framework incorporates transparency (how well informed on 
finances the public is kept) as a pillar, joining it to accountability and suggesting 
standards of credibility: aggregate accuracy, consistency over time, and composi-
tional invariance of financial indicators. Preliminary results nevertheless seem 
familiar. Expenditure executed slightly better on average than revenue; lack of 
transparency is mostly due to economic shocks, challenges in revenue forecasting 
(poor forecasts), the use of supplementary expenditures, and the unreliability of 
donor funds. But a great deal of data will become available, both local (the BTI) 
and national. Theory to shape expectations would help: what is needed is a model 
in which incumbents have distinct policy preferences and are held accountable for 
the difference between observed outputs and prior expectations. There is one: the 
Meirowitz (2007) model of accountability assumes incumbents belong to parties 
with distinct policy preferences and have private information about feasibility con-
straints on policy. One could incorporate transparency by allowing voters’ informa-
tion about feasibility constraints to vary but so far I have not seen this done.
Creative accounting is not new; fiscal illusion and false “adjustment” have been 
studied for years. Much of the recent transparency literature builds on re-election 
and election-timing motivating government obfuscation and concealment (see 
Hudspeth et al., 2015; most recently Repetto, 2018). Questions abound. How 
important is election-timing in government accounting choices? Is accrual account-
ing manipulation-proof? In world where fiscal policy is increasingly focused on 
second-order, complex rules with contested meanings, what does this do to the 
need for transparency? Different accounting systems treat assets and liabilities dif-
ferently; Alt, Lassen and Wehner (2014) show the need to dig deep into the account-
ing components to detect manipulation. More information on variation in public 
sector accounting standards will be very helpful: the information concerning 14 
countries recently made available (Brusca et al., 2015) is a good start. Fund-shift-
ing to evade rules, delays in passing and releasing data on budgets and other com-
prehensive financial reports, treating public-private partnerships as non-public: all 
need further study. There is a burgeoning area for transparency studies with new 
applications all the time to corporate governance and executive pay.
Finally, there is some indication that participation has different effects from older 
measures of transparency. It may be that mandating participation has more impact 
on targeting and distribution of expenditures, by both geography and gender, on 
public satisfaction with outcomes and process, and on citizen (especially women’s) 
sense of empowerment. But participation’s impact also can be frustrated by 
entrenched gatekeepers. Competent participation is highly information dependent 
and can require some sophistication to understand how best to use the informa-
tion. It is thus also vulnerable to strategic information-providing, particularly 
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114 THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE
Increasingly we see that transparency alone is often not the answer. The literature 
on corruption reminds us that enforcement power often has to be added to free 
transmission of information to make transparency effective. For instance, publi-
cized random audits did expel some corrupt mayors in Brazil (Ferraz and Finan, 
2008) but this happened only in conjunction with active local radio, in contexts 
where re-election was possible, so losing was a potential penalty. In contrast, 
Olken’s (2007) Indonesian audits were ineffective because no penalties were pos-
sible, not having been fixed by public participation. The need for competence and 
sophistication grows as transparency comes to be seen as a cheaper substitute for 
enforcement. As Olken put it, “Transparency and publicity are powerful tools but 
only if combined with grassroots organizations with the incentive and the compe-
tence to use the information provided.”
What else have we learned? First, I would say: recently, to have more respect for 
complexity, a heightened awareness of tradeoffs, and the importance of more 
attention to institutional detail. The general problem of the endogeneity of institu-
tions has only rarely been attacked, so the growth of experiments is very helpful 
– but not definitive, at least in part because the experimental work suggests that 
“local” is important. Second, we have seen how the efficacy of transparency 
depends on social and political context: we see this in comparing democracies 
with autocracies, the inconsistent effects of resource dependence, and how low 
levels of literacy/empowerment make information less actionable. Third, we learn 
again to respect unintended consequences like the threat of authoritarian conform-
ity and popular disillusionment and the danger of negative externalities, particu-
larly around the Internet. All in all, even though the World Bank (2016) is still a 
cheerleader, it is just not as easy as the State Department said: what works best 
when there are multiple agents? Making information actionable (by public or 
prosecutors) is challenging. Technology accentuates the impact of transparency, 
but cuts both ways, as in the case of Internet information provision: while more 
information is provided less verification is possible.
Worse, participation in polarized contexts in the presence of motivated reasoning 
creates a novel tradeoff. Motivated reasoning (Lodge and Taber, 2000) describes 
a tendency to seek information that confirms prior beliefs (i.e., a confirmation 
bias), to view evidence consistent with prior opinions as stronger or more effec-
tive (prior-attitude effect), and to dismiss evidence inconsistent with prior opin-
ions, regardless of objective accuracy (disconfirmation bias). The result: with 
information in conflict, more information means less updating and no fact-check-
ing. With polarization, this means that ramping up transparency is not the solution 
with nonrandom exposure to messages. Expert credibility requires consensus 
facts but strategic media pundits, partisan think tanks, and, even more, interest 
groups raise doubts. More sophistication is needed to connect action, effects, and 
benefits to the individual. It seems likely that this could once again make an inter-
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